Intelligence and Military Operations (Studies in Intelligence)

This is an outstanding book on military intelligence aspects of several subjects or campaigns: Chancellorsville and Gettysburg in the American Civil War, the British campaigns in Mesopotamia and Palestine during WW I, the general Japanese Army disregard for intelligence predating WW II, the Desert Campaign in North Africa in 1940 - 1942, Convoy PQ17, Macarthur’s amphibious landings in Hollandia, New Guinea in early 1944, German Luftwaffe intelligence (or the failure thereof), and the war in the Mediterranean 1941 - 1945. There are some interesting assessments of German intelligence in WW II. For example in page 20: “One result was that the Operations Branch tended to pay no attention to what their Intelligence Branch told them. … As long as the Germans maintained the initiative, their reliance on excellence in military operations as a substitute for intelligence went unnoticed.” Page 76: “The Japanese and German approach to war was premised on irrational, sentimental thinking that had to ignore higher-level intelligence. …A rational analysis would have shown that winning a war on the scale envisaged by Hitler or the Japanese would be impossible in the long run. … no such estimate was ever seriously prepared.” An overall assessment of German intelligence efforts in WW II is given in pages 426 and 427: “ .. Because of the political structure of the Reich, there was little coordination of intelligence… Competing German intelligence bodies — and there were more than a dozen of them outside of the armed services — were insular in there attitude … No organization such as the British Joint Intelligence Committee could exist…. Insularity and empire - building, [were] endemic in the Third Reich and encouraged by Hitler for political reasons…” Finally in pages 440 - 441: “On the German side the organizational shortcomings were so intimately bound up with the political structure of the Third Reich that only a change in regime could have made any fundamental difference. … The consequences of telling the truth could be so unpleasant it is hardly surprising that reports were doctored to suit the prejudices of those receiving them.”

The late Michael Handel was an outstanding teacher of military art and military intelligence. "Intelligence and Military Operations" is a collection of excellent essays presented at a 1990 US Army War College symposium, as edited by Handel for publication. Handel's introductory essay sets an honest, no frills tone for the topics that follow. He sets military intelligence in its proper context in war and especially in relation to operations. Handel makes no pretense that intelligence by itself wins wars. His narrative convincingly demonstrates that the proper use of intelligence make superior armies more efficient and provides small but agile armies a potentially battle-winning edge. The book includes two essays on the use of military intelligence in the American Civil War, two more for the First World War, and a total of seven essays on the Second World War. The various authors are subject-matter experts and the quality of the essays is uniformly quite high. This reviewer especially enjoyed John Ferris' essay on the use of intelligence by the British Eighth Army in the Western Desert, 1940-1942. Ferris documents the struggle of British forces to effectively apply their undoubted advantage in strategic intelligence to campaign planning and tactical battle management, against a tactically proficient and audacious German Afrika Corps. Eighth Army had to grow both a tactical intelligence architecture and commanders who could integrate intelligence into their operations. "Intelligence and Military Operations" is very highly recommended as an outstanding introduction to the subject for students of intelligence and of military art. It is long overdue for reissue and well worth acquiring whether new or used.

Have not have the opportunity to read most of the essays as yet. Book was very highly reviewed.

This is a collection of case studies and essays on the use of intelligence by field commanders. It consists of papers from a series of international conferences held at Carlisle, Pa, from 1985 to 1988. Like all works monitored or written by this compiler, a professor at the Army War College, it is thoroughly researched and full of sound judgements prepared by many of the leading scholars of twentieth intelligence history. Frank Cass, the publisher is noted for quality studies produced for the specialist and scholar. The volume was originally a special issue of the journal Intelligence and National Security. It is intended as part of a series of thematic texts. Belongs on the shelf of every serious researcher of the uses of intelligence.

The book is very well written and researched. It uses specific examples in history to support the authors view of how intelligence effects military operations. I would recommend the book to anyone interested in understanding how intelligence helps or hinders military operations.